Friday, November 21, 2003

Dispatches: Nation-Building in Iraq: Lessons From the Past:
"James Dobbins has long been one of those troubleshooters who never seem to miss a crisis.

As the special United States envoy for Afghanistan, Mr. Dobbins was responsible for finding and installing a successor to the Taliban after they were toppled in 2001. During the 1990's, Mr. Dobbins hop-scotched from one trouble spot to another as he served as special envoy to Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia.

So when he offers a critique of the Bush administration's nation-building effort in Iraq, it is worth paying attention. Now out of government, Mr. Dobbins, who has worked for Republican as well as Democratic administrations, does not have a partisan ax to grind."


I spoke with Mr. Dobbins after reading "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq," which Mr. Dobbins co-wrote with other experts at the Rand Corporation, where he is now a senior official. L. Paul Bremer III, the American administrator of Iraq, describes the recent book as a valuable "how to" manual on nation-building. Nevertheless, Mr. Dobbins believes that much of the Bush administration's planning for the political and physical reconstruction of Iraq is an object lesson in how not to go about the nation-building task.

Mr. Dobbins's basic argument is this: The Bush administration would have been better prepared for its Iraq mission if it had heeded the lessons of the United States' ongoing peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and other recent nation-building efforts. Those are cases, he argues, in which the United States had to contend with a security vacuum and the potential for ethnic strife, and designed a force to maintain order.

But the Bush administration, he argues, has such disdain for anything associated with former President Bill Clinton that it largely ignored useful lessons from recent United States peacekeeping operations. To the extent it looked to history, the Mr. Bush's administration turned to the American occupation of Germany and Japan more than half a century ago.

It was, Mr. Dobbins says, a costly exercise in "political correctness."

"Iraq in 2003 looks more like Yugoslavia in 1996 than Germany and Japan in 1945," Mr. Dobbins says. "What they have not done is look to the models worked out in the 1990's for sharing the burden and allowing others to participate in the management of the enterprise."

Iraq poses its own unique challenges, but Mr. Dobbins argues that the nation-building problems there more closely resemble those faced in Bosnia and Kosovo than in Germany. Like the former Yugoslavia, Iraq is a multi-ethnic state that was held together by a dictator. Like Bosnia and Kosovo, it has a Muslim population. Unlike Germany, Iraq does not have an ethnically homogenous population or a first-world economy. Nor has it been devastated by total war.

The failure to reflect on the sort of security breakdowns and power vacuums that the United States confronted in the former Yugoslavia, or Afghanistan and Haiti for that matter, Mr. Dobbins said, left the Bush administration less prepared for post-Hussein Iraq than it should have been. There is little historical support for the Defense Department's initial claim that it would take fewer troops to occupy Iraq and stabilize the country than to topple the Saddam Hussein regime.…

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/21/international/middleeast/21CND-GORD.html

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