It's Democracy, Like It or Not
Since its emergence as a world power at the beginning of the last century, the United States has often made cold-eyed compromises with the crosscurrents of democracy around the world. From Latin America to Asia, Africa and beyond, Republican and Democratic administrations alike have welcomed democracy when it serves American interests, and been far more ambivalent when it complicates American strategic goals or national security.

Mr. Bush may welcome the idea of an Iraq more democratic than Saddam Hussein's despotic regime, but his administration bemoaned the democratic vote of Turkey's Parliament to deny American troops access to Turkish soil, and the resistance of democracies in "old Europe" to a march to war. The president would doubtless blanch at plebiscites that installed Islamic fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, or a Palestinian democracy that kept Yasir Arafat in power.

Last week, Mr. Bush said he would seek another vote of support from the United Nations Security Council, that unruly parliament of nations, for action against Iraq, "no matter what the whip count is." But he insisted in almost the same breath that "we really don't need anybody's permission" to defend American interests.

Such a gap between preachment and practice is common to all powerful democracies. Only tyrannies can be entirely consistent. But from its earliest days, the American ideal promised something more, and was held up as a global example.

Yet for most of the 19th century, the United States bought or won territory from foreign powers in war, avoided alliances and stood alone. And even though the United States helped found the United Nations and the post-World War II international security framework, it has faced varying degrees of anti-Americanism and charges of hypocrisy.

"It's something much deeper now," said James Chace, a professor of government and public law at Bard College. "What's happening is that the manner in which this administration has largely talked about the world, the kind of general arrogance and bullying tone, just reinforces the sense that we are now seen, and I think rightly, as an imperial power."

"The question," he added, "is whether it will be seen as relatively benevolent, or not."

"When it comes to the Middle East, we have to face the fact that the critical mobilizing issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser. "Democracy is a consequence of incremental hard work. It's not the consequence of either direct repression, à la Ariel Sharon, or bringing the entire Middle East structure tumbling down, à la Bush. It's an incremental process of building confidence, establishing relationships and pushing people in the direction of compromise."

"Grand-sounding rhetoric on the sidelines, followed by an intense war, which is likely to produce local resentments and further alienate the world, is not going to either produce democracy, or ultimately increase Israel's security," he added. "If we had democracy today in Egypt, we wouldn't have Mubarak but some members of the Muslim Brotherhood. If we're not careful, and pushed for a plebiscite in Saudi Arabia, Prince Abdullah might not do as well as Osama bin Laden."
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/09/weekinreview/09PURD.html