Monday, November 15, 2004

Falluja, Fred Hampton and Mark Clark

Falluja, Fred Hampton and Mark Clark

Nail holes claimed as evidence they were fired on
Dec 04, 1969 Chicago

As they lie sleeping in their Chicago, Illinois, apartment, Fred
Hampton and Mark Clark are gunned down by 14 police officers. Nearly a hundred bullets had been fired in what police described as a fierce gun battle with members of the Black Panther Party. However, ballistics experts later determined that only one of those bullets came from the Panthers' side. In addition, the "bullet holes" in the front door of the apartment, which police pointed to as evidence that the Panthers had been shooting from within the apartment, were actually nail holes created by police in an attempt to cover up the attack. Four other Black Panthers were wounded in the raid, as well as two police officers.

The raid, which had been led by Cook County State Attorney Edward Hanrahan, was only one of many attempts by the government to weaken the Black Power movement. Under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI had been battling civil rights activists and other minority leaders for years with their Cointelpro program, whose purpose, according to one FBI document, was to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist hate type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership and supporters. " Although the FBI was not responsible for leading this particular raid, a federal grand jury indicated that the bureau played a significant role in the events leading up to the raid; Hanrahan had utilized information provided by FBI informant William O'Neal, who was third in command of the Chicago Panthers, to plan his attack. There was also a conscious effort by the FBI to use "aggressive and imaginary tactics" to prevent the "rise of a 'messiah' who could unify and electrify the militant black nationalist movement. " They apparently considered Fred Hampton, an outspoken, charismatic activist who was chairman of the Illinois Black Panther Party, to be such a potential leader.



Despite the evidence provided by ballistics experts showing that police had fired 99 percent of the bullets and had falsified the report on the incident, the first federal grand jury did not indict anyone involved in the raid.
Despite the evidence provided by ballistics experts showing that police had fired 99 percent of the bullets and had falsified the report on the incident, the first federal grand jury did not indict anyone involved in the raid. Furthermore, even though a subsequent grand jury did indict all the police officers involved, the charges were dismissed. Survivors of the attack and relatives of Hampton and Clark filed a $47.7 million suit against Hanrahan and 28 other officials in 1970. After an 18-month trial, which did not take place until 1977, all charges were dismissed. However, two years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that the Federal Government had obstructed justice by withholding information and reinstated the case against 24 of the defendants. The relatives and survivors finally won their case in 1979.

http://www.safran-arts.com/42day/history/h4dec/h4dec04.html


http://www.gigfoot.net/lol/facts/3979.html

April 28,2003 Falluja
In the view of the soldiers, they acted appropriately to the threat as perceived at the time. "That night there was an escalation of force," platoon Sgt. Crosson said. "We don't want to wait until one of our guys gets hit. You can only take so much before you respond."

In addition, they responded in accordance with the rules of engagement, the soldiers said, which were described as the "seven S's": shout, shove, smoke, spray, show, strike and shoot. "We fired precision fire at those who were firing at us from inside a crowd-and they chose that environment," Nantz claimed.

U.S. soldiers gave a similar account to journalists who visited al-Falluja in the aftermath of the incident. 2LT. Davidson, for example, according to the New York Times, said that twenty to thirty protesters were shooting rifles mostly in the air, and that soldiers had responded with smoke grenades before several more armed people appeared from homes across the street and began shooting directly at the soldiers, forcing the soldiers to return fire.39 U.S. soldiers, according to the Jerusalem Post, said that the school compound was fired upon from three directions and that "armed militants no more than six meters outside the compound blasted away at the school."40 An unnamed soldier gave a similar account of the battle, according to the Guardian:

We've been sitting here taking fire for three days. It was enough to get your nerves wracked. When they [protesters]marched down the road and started shooting at the compound there was nothing for us to do but defend ourselves. They were firing from alleyways and buildings where we couldn't see. Guys were in line with hot chow. When bullets fell into the compound, people in that chow line ran for cover. From that moment it was all business. We started putting on body armor and went up on that roof.

As detailed as these accounts are, the physical evidence at the school does not support claims of an effective attack on the building as described by U.S. troops.



Human Rights Watch researchers and the organization's senior military analyst spent several hours at the al-Qa'id school, closely inspecting all rooms of the school, the exterior walls and perimeter wall for evidence of bullet damage that would support the soldiers' contention that gunmen had fired at the school. Human Rights Watch found no compelling evidence to support that claim.
Human Rights Watch researchers and the organization's senior military analyst spent several hours at the al-Qa'id school, closely inspecting all rooms of the school, the exterior walls and perimeter wall for evidence of bullet damage that would support the soldiers' contention that gunmen had fired at the school. Human Rights Watch found no compelling evidence to support that claim.

The inspection found two spots on the schools façade facing the street that might indicate bullet impact. The southern side of the wall near the second floor had two shallow pockmarks that might have been caused by bullets, but could also have come from thrown rocks. Three pockmarks on the northern corner of the front wall (below where the machine gun had been placed on the roof) might also have been caused by bullets. Given the lack of deep penetration into the wall, the bullets in both places, if that is what caused the marks, must have had a soft lead core. No damage was seen in any of the school's rooms or the perimeter wall.

The bullet holes that some journalists reported seeing on the perimeter wall turned out to be holes left by nails-some of the nails were still in the holes, and the square patterns formed by the different holes showed they had been used to hang posters or signs. Human Rights Watch found no evidence of the "bullet holes in a second-story window" or the school façade "pocked with bullet holes" described by one journalist.

There was, however, evidence of rock-throwing. Human Rights Watch found numerous broken windows at the school, chipped walls and rocks both inside the classrooms and at the base of the school (possibly thrown from outside). Such evidence was particularly clear on the north side of the building.

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraqfalluja/Iraqfalluja-04.htm#P273_41771

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraqfalluja/

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraqfalluja/Iraqfalluja-08.htm#P388_58785

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&q=site%3Ahrw.org+police+killed+in+falluja

Coalition Forces in Iraq are not subject to Iraqi law. According to Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 17, coalition personnel are "immune from local criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of arrest or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their parent states."

Given the absence of Iraqi legal structures to hold coalition forces accountable, it is incumbent on the occupying powers of the participating countries to investigate all allegations of abuse, and to punish those found to have violated domestic military codes, international humanitarian law, or human rights standards. Both the laws of war and non-derogable human rights standards require the investigation of suspicious or apparently unlawful killings, even during times of armed conflict. As of mid-October 2003, the United States military was not fulfilling that obligation, thus creating an atmosphere of impunity for U.S. troops.

Two types of investigations are possible in the U.S. military: administrative and criminal. Administrative procedures such as a Commander's Inquiry or an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation can result in "adverse administrative action," such as fines, extra duty or confinement. Criminal investigations involve a military court and can lead to a court martial.

Human Rights Watch is not aware of any criminal investigations into cases of alleged use of excessive or disproportionate force. As of October 1, the U.S. military said it had completed five administrative investigations above the division level, and all of them under the authority of the Deputy Commanding General in Iraq.

In addition to the cases mentioned above, a high-level investigation is ongoing into the friendly fire killing of eight Iraqi police and a Jordanian guard by the 82nd Airborne in al-Falluja on September 12. The U.S. military apologized for the incident and appointed Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Schloesser, assistant commander of the 101st Airborne Division, to head an investigation. The U.S. JAG was not aware of other investigations ongoing as of September 23, although officials said they might not know of investigations conducted on the division level.

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq1003/7.htm

Iraqi Civilians Fall Victim to Hair Triggers 'Regrettable' Incidents Claim Bystanders, Police Officers, Even Children.

http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2003/iraq102103.htm



con·cept: Falluja, Fred Hampton and Mark Clark