Monday, December 17, 2001

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 2002

The question immediately arose on September 11 and has persisted: As horrific as the terrorist attacks were, what might have happened if the terrorists who seized jumbo jets and used them as weapons against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had aimed them at nuclear power plants instead? And if more attacks are likely, as government officials have said, are nuclear facilities on the terrorist target list?

Could U.S. nuclear power facilities be the next targets of terrorism? If so, how well defended should they be? In “The NRC: What, Me Worry?” Daniel Hirsch looks at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s rules governing security at commercial nuclear power plants, and finds them sorely lacking. For example, even though the September 11 attacks were a coordinated effort perpetrated by at least 19 criminals acting in four teams, security guards at power reactors are not required to defend against more than three intruders, more than one team using coordinated tactics, more than one “inside” operator, weapons greater than hand-held automatic weapons, an attack by boat or plane, or any attack by “enemies of the United States.”
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2002/jf02/jf02hirsch.html

No comments:

Post a Comment

con·cept